Over the past two decades, the Indian Ocean moored surface buoy observation networks have expanded in the spatiotemporal domain and technologically matured with system reliability, availability, cost optimization, and precision measurement of meteorological and oceanographic parameters as the key targets. Based on the return of experiences in the development, operation, and maintenance of the moored buoy observation networks over two decades, this paper for the first time summarizes the reliability metrics achieved by the National Institute of Ocean Technology (NIOT)-operated moored buoy networks, the healthiness monitoring interval implemented to achieve the highest level of on-demand reliability, the methodologies adopted to ensure highest possible system availability, and data returns. The tsunami buoy network with two buoys and the meteorological buoy with cyclone tracking sensors are found to have a mean time between failure of 1.27 years and 0.5 years, respectively. The identified performances provide a baseline for defining the technical improvement targets, identifying alternate technologies, incorporating redundancies, cost optimization, and maintenance planning. The approach serves as a reference for reliability assessment and integrity management of similar moored buoy ocean observation networks and for evolving standards for oceanographic systems.
Introduction
S ustained real-time ocean observing systems using moored surface buoys (MSBs) are essential for effective weather prediction, ocean state forecast, climate change studies, and tsunami monitoring and to validate satellite observations (McPhaden et al., 1998) . Precision meteorological and sea surface parameters are required for cyclone tracking, and large-scale spatiotemporal oceanographic parameters are required for effective modeling of the ocean dynamics and precise monsoon predictions (Ravichandran, 2015) . Precision monitoring and reporting of water level changes in the deep ocean during tsunamigenic earthquakes are required for tsunami early warning systems (Nayak & Kumar, 2008) . The Indian Ocean observation network comprising multiple MSB are deployed in the challenging deep ocean environments and coastal locations using position moorings. The MSB house power systems, meteorological, sea surface and subsurface oceanographic instruments, and data acquisition systems communicate with the shore stations through satellite and terrestrial telemetry networks (Venkatesan et al., 2013a) . The Indian tsunami early warning system (ITEWS) comprises seabedlocated bottom pressure measurement systems communicating with moored tsunami buoys using acoustic telemetry and, in turn, to the shore centers via satellite (Kumar et al., 2012a) . The rapid technological advancements in electronics, telecommunication, mooring materials, energy storage, computational infrastructure, and numerical modeling tools pave the way for realizing robust moored buoy observation networks. Reliability, availability, and maintainability are the key requirements for the MSB networks as the data are used for societal protection, climate change studies, and moreover, offshore system outages result in loss of time-critical data, costly interventions, and reinstallations. The need for assessing the reliability of the Indian moored buoy networks used for monitoring cyclones and tsunamis is evident from the postevent analysis conducted by the Japan Meteorological Agency after the tsunamigenic earthquakes that affected the Pacific coast of Japan in 2011. Based on the return of experiences over the past two decades, this paper summarizes the technical maturity, achieved reliability metrics, and implemented integrity management strategies for the National Institute of Ocean Technology (NIOT)-operated Indian Ocean MSB network from position mooring till data reception. The paper for the first time presents the reliability determination methodology adopting applicable industrial and offshore standards, and the achieved reliability metrics shall serve as a baseline for further technical improvements and integrity management of similar ocean observation networks.
Indian Moored Buoy Network and Its Importance
The Indian Ocean is land-locked by the Asian landmass and hence cannot transport the heat gained in the tropics to the higher northern latitudes. At the same time, it gains additional heat/mass from the tropical Pacific through the Indonesian throughflow. This unique geography among the global oceans has important implications on ocean circulation, chemistry, biology, and consequently on the climate and biogeochemistry of the ocean. As a result, the Bay of Bengal (BoB) and the Arabian Sea basins are the locations where a large proportion of the South Asian coastal cyclones and impacts occur, and the frequency of intense cyclones is in an uptrend (South Asian Disaster Knowledge Network, 2009 (Bhat et al., 2001; Bhat & Narasimha, 2007; Wijesekera et al., 2016) . The need for systematic and sustained longterm ocean observations with increased spatiotemporal measurements are essential for advancing our understanding of the role of the Indian Ocean in the climate system, monsoon variability, interseaosnal variability, Indian Ocean dipole, ocean circulation, heat budget, and biogeochemical cycles. Subsequent to the OceanObs99 meeting, IndOOS, a multiplatform long-term observing system, which consists of a surface moored array, Argo floats, surface drifting buoys, tide gauges, voluntary observing ship-based XBT/XCTD systems, and satellite measurements, was taken up (Ravichandran, 2015) . For enabling sustained long-term ocean observations, the Government of India (GoI) established the Ocean Observation Systems (OOS), formerly called the National Data Buoy Program at the NIOT in 1996, for developing, operating, and maintaining Indian moored buoy observational systems and related telecommunication networks in the Indian waters (Venkatesan et al., 2016a) ; the Research Moored Array for African AsianAustralian Monsoon Analysis and Prediction (RAMA) during 2009 to understand the variability in the Indian Ocean and its influence in the monsoons (McPhaden et al., 2009) ; and the Ocean Moored Buoy Network in the Indian Ocean (OMNI) developed and operated by NIOT-OOS to understand the variability in the upper ocean thermohaline and current structures on several timescales, which has important bearing on the evolution of the seasonal monsoons and cyclones in 2011 (Venkatesan et al., 2013b) .
In the Indian Ocean, there are two tsunamigenic zones, the AndamanSumatra trench and the Makran coast. As a result, tsunamis are an ever present threat in India's 7,500-km-long coastline where more than 30% of the national population resides. In response
FIGURE 1
Locations of INCOIS-ITEWS, NIOT-MCC, and subduction zones (Kumar et al., 2012b) .
to the 2004 Sumatra-Andaman earthquake-triggered tsunami that claimed about 230,000 lives in 14 Indian Ocean rim countries, the ITEWS was established in 2007 with the Indian Tsunami Early Warning Center (ITEWC) at the Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Sciences (INCOIS), Hyderabad, and the Indian Tsunami Buoy System (ITBS) at NIOT to develop, maintain, and disseminate the deep sea level data to the ITEWC (Figure 1 ). The ITEWC has been serving as the primary source of tsunami advisory for India and as a tsunami service provider for the entire Indian Ocean region (Kumar et al., 2012b) .
Since 1997, NIOT-OOS has carried out more than 650 buoy deployments at sites ranging from coastal waters to deep oceans (Figure 2 ), spanning between 63°E to 93°E and 6°N to 20°N for collecting meteorological, water surface and subsurface parameters, as well as tsunami water level data. During the past two decades, the NIOT-OOS-operated Indian moored buoy networks have detected about 41 cyclones and 11 water level change events used to monitor tsunami waves Venkatesan et al., 2016b) , which served as important inputs to various agencies including the Indian Meteorological Department. The scientific observations were useful for understanding Indian Ocean dynamics (Mathew et al., 2016; Venkatesan et al., 2013a Venkatesan et al., , 2014 Venkatesan et al., , 2015d Thushara & Vinayachandran, 2014; Vimala et al., 2014) , calibration and validation of the satellite observations (Shukla et al., 2013) .
The NIOT-OOS-operated MSB are categorized into three families, which includes the meteorological ocean buoys for measuring and telemetering meteorological and sea surface parameters; the OMNI for measuring and telemetering meteorological, surface, and subsurface profiles up to 500 m water depths; and the ITBS for detecting and reporting water level changes during tsunamis. The 24/7 manned and automated NIOTMission Control Center receives data transmitted from the MSB, and the customized Advanced Data Reception and Analysis System (ADDRESS) software enables data analysis and dissemination of the data to decision makers and stake holders (Venkatesan et al., 2015a) . The data reception architecture for the moored buoy network is shown in Figure 3 .
The surface buoy made of polyurethane foam-filled core and encased by a fiber-reinforced plastic hull is moored to the seabed using a weight and anchor
FIGURE 2
MSB deployed in Indian waters.
FIGURE 3
Moored buoy network data reception architecture (Sundar et al., 2015) .
May/June 2018 Volume 52 Number 3 system. The mooring is arranged in an inverse catenary configuration using a negatively buoyant wire rope, nylon rope, and positively buoyant polypropylene (PP) rope, with a series of shackles and swivels. The chain attached to the weight and the PP rope is held in an upright position using a group of subsurface floats. A combination wire rope, which has PP sheathing on the metal rope, is used for connecting the surface buoy and the nylon rope so as to avoid failures arising out of fish bites in the oxygen-rich subsurface region. The central cylinder portion of the MSB houses the energy storage batteries for the data acquisition systems, which are connected to the externally located instruments using marinegrade cables. The mast is equipped with meteorological sensors and an antenna for transmitting the collected data to the NIOT-MCC through the Inmarsat, INSAT, and GSM networks. In the OMNI buoys, the subsurface sensors communicate to the data acquisition system through the induction mooring. In the tsunami monitoring buoys, the seafloor-moored bottom pressure recorder communicates with the surface buoy by acoustic telemetry. The Inmarsat data from the MSB are received at the NIOT-MCC through the Inmarsat land-earth stations. The data related to tsunami warning is retransmitted from NIOT to INCOIS through very small aperture terminal (VSAT) telemetry as well as by public network (Sundar et al., 2015) .
Reliability Estimation Methodology and Standards Adopted
Reliability is the ability of a system to perform its intended function without failure or degradation over the defined time period. Reliability estimations done using numerical methods based on field failure data and published failure models serve as a yardstick for comparison with alternate technologies, continuous improvements, implementation of redundancies for increasing the system availability, and for maintenance planning of the time-critical MSB network. Reliability is expressed as failure-intime (FIT), usually in failures per billion hours, and represented as λ. Given the number of failures and the total cumulative period of operation, λ is calculated as For example, if a system reported 10 failures in a cumulative operating period of 100,000 h, λ = (10/100,000) × 10 9 = 10,000 FIT and the mean time between failure (MTBF), which is 1/λ, is computed as 10 9 /10,000 = 100,000 h; i.e., 11.4 years.
For the system with a failure rate of λ, the probability of failure (PoF), Q(t) in % in a period t is computed based on the relationship
For example, the PoF for the same system in a 1-year period for the computed λ of 10,000 is calculated as
Based on the MTBF and the mean time to repair (MTTR), the availability of the system is calculated based on the relationship
The on-demand reliability applicable for the time-critical instrumented safety systems is the capability of the system to perform its intended function on-demand during the defined period. On-demand reliability is the key requirement for ocean observing systems operating throughout the year in a hostile offshore environment and involved in monitoring extreme environmental events such as cyclones and tsunamis. The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61508 standard (Smith & Simpson, 2004) , based on the principles of the safety life cycle and safety integrity level (SIL) concepts, provides a framework for determining the on-demand reliability of the instrumented safety systems and the proof test intervals/ healthiness monitoring intervals necessary to maintain system integrity. If a demand occurs after a time, the probability that the system has already failed is the PoF on demand (PFD). The SIL defines the degree of safety protection required by the process and consecutively the safety reliability of the system necessary to achieve the function. SIL has four levels (1-4). SIL4 is the safest, which corresponds to an acceptable failure rate of 1 in 10 5 demands in a period of 1 year. Table 1 describes the various SIL levels, with the corresponding PFD.
The SIL requirements for the specific application are computed, taking into consideration the risk consequence (C), alternate protection systems in place (P), human occupancy in the area being protected (F ), and the system demand factor (W ). This SIL determination methodology, which is applied in the process and marine industries, is followed for determining SIL requirements. The consequence parameters varies from catastrophic to negligible based on the impact on the health, environment, and financial aspects; P takes a value of either 0 or 1 based on the availability or unavailability of alternate protection systems; based on the human occupancy F takes the values of 2, 1, and 0, which corresponds to continuous, occasional, and rare human presence in the area, and W takes the values from 3 to 8, depending on the system demand rate as defined in Table 2 .
The identified P, F, and W parameters are summed up and plotted against the consequence factor in the risk graph matrix shown in Table 3 to obtain the required level of SIL. In the case of system failures to detect tsunamis and cyclone events, which leads to catastrophe, the sum of P, F, and W takes the values of 1, 2 and 9, totaling 12, and indicating on-demand reliability requirements of better than the most stringent SIL4.
The described methodology adopted for computing the on-demand reliability and the required healthiness monitoring interval for the Indian MSB network subsystems is represented in Figure 4 .
As described and shown in Figure 4 , computation of the failure rates (FIT) for the MSB network subsystems are done based on the field failure data recorded in the OOS-maintained Failure Reporting and Corrective Action System (FRACAS) register, failure models provided by industrial standards including Det Norske Veritas Offshore Reliability Data 
FIGURE 4
Methodology adopted for on-demand reliability estimation (Kumar et al., 2016) .
May/June 2018 Volume 52 Number 3 , 1997) , and relevant manufacturer data. For FIT computed using the models, the relevant operating and environmental conditions are considered. The identified failure rates for the subsystems are summarized in Table 4 . For computing the PoF for the system for the defined period, failure tree analysis (FTA) based on the bottom-top approach are developed based on the identified failure events using TOTAL SATODEV GRIF reliability estimation software (Total, 2013) . The failure events include system functionality failures that had occurred over the past two decades and those likely to occur, identified based on the guidelines of MIL HDBK 217 Failure Model Effects and Criticality Analysis (MIL HDBK, 1991) . The GRIF software is widely used for carrying out reliability and safety analysis for the time-critical safety systems (Vedachalam et al., 2014a (Vedachalam et al., , 2014b (Vedachalam et al., , 2014c in the process and offshore industries. For the identified system functional failure rates, the healthiness monitoring interval requirements for meeting the SIL4 requirements are identified using the GRIF software SIL module.
The numerical simulations using FTA helps to analyze the PoF of a system as a whole over any desired period of time, taking into account the failure rates and degradation patterns till component level, identify the MTBF which essential for maintenance planning, and analyze the influence of incorporating redundancies to attain the target reliability and availability. Manual computations based on the field-reported failures do not account for the failures that are likely to occur in the future. Hence, the failure analysis based on a statistical analysis approach helps to incorporate all possible subsystem/component failure events and compute the reliability of the system.
The technical maturity and the reliability of the MSB network subsystems-including onboard energy storage, position mooring, telemetry system, sensors including meteorological, sea surface and subsurface, INSAT telemetry, terrestrial networks, and the data reception system at the NIOT-MCC-computed based on the described methodology and published in various reputed journals, are summarized in the following chapters.
Subsystem Technological Maturity and Reliability Metrics

MSB Power System
The first-generation MSB energy storage system, operational during the period 1997-2006, comprised two numbers of 12-V lead-acid batteries charged by 80-W solar panels. The 1.2-kWh energy storage catered the onboard energy requirement for a maximum period of 10 days even in the absence of solar radiation. From the FTA results shown in Figure 5 , the PoF of the MSB power system in a period of 1 year was 22.34% (Gate Or35), which is less than SIL1. This was due to the higher failure rates in the charging system and solar panel damages due to vandalism. In the FTA, Gate And34 denotes the redundancy.
The second-generation power system operational since January 2007 was realized with a 26-kWh capacity lithium thionyl chloride (LiSOCl 2 ) cell-based battery pack kept protected inside the central cylinder of the MSB. The pack was configured with eight modules of 3.26 kWh capacity pods operated in parallel to comply with an on-demand reliability target of SIL4 and ease of maintainability.
The recently introduced thirdgeneration power system is a hybrid type comprising 1.2-kWh lead acid batteries with solar charging system and a 13-kWh capacity LiSOCl 2 battery pack (which is half of the energy capacity compared to the second generation) operated in parallel. The configuration is considered based on reduced vandalism events, near-zero failures observed from the accumulated return of experiences from nearly 0.5 billion LiSOCl 2 cell-hours with a cell failure rate of less than 8 FIT, and the implemented annual maintenance plan. The configuration ensures that, even in case of damage to the solar panels immediately after deployment, the LiSOCl 2 battery pack could be able to supply the required energy until the next scheduled maintenance. The FTA simulation results for the hybrid configuration with the PoF of 1.6 × 10 −13 (Gate And39) confirming to SIL4 is shown in Figure 6 . Multiple redundancy gate KOutofN40 indicates that the system can tolerate until the eighth battery pod fails, as one pod caters for a period of 3.5 months, which falls within the next scheduled maintenance interval. The hybrid configuration thus offers a trade-off between the SIL4 level of on-demand reliability and reduced energy cost of data transmission compared to the second generation.
A pilot model fourth-generation power system with lead acid batteries powered with solar and wind energy generator and backed by LiSoCl 2
FIGURE 6
FIGURE 5
FTA results for the power system failure in a 1-year period.
battery storage aimed in a greener footprint, reduced energy cost and sustained reliability, and tested during 2014 is shown in Figure 7 (Venkatesan et al., 2015b) . The battery details, reliability metrics, and achieved cost of data transmission for the three generations are summarized in Table 5 .
Mooring
A reliable position mooring is the lynchpin for the MSB. Excursions beyond the defined radius from the deployed location is unacceptable for the MSB involved in tsunami monitoring applications, as it needs to be maintained within the acoustic reception circle, which depends on the beam width of the bottom pressure recorder system transmitter and the water depth. Reliability analysis is done based on the 15 mooring hardware failures (which has resulted in loss of buoy position for tsunami buoys and mooring snap-offs for all buoys) reported from different configurations of the annually maintained moorings that have cumulatively clocked more than 0.76 million hours over a 5-year period (Table 6 ). The mooring hardware failures included damages in the nylon wire rope interface, polypropylene rope, material corrosion, biofouling. and mooring walk under extreme environmental conditions (Venkatesan et al., 2015c (Venkatesan et al., , 2017a (Venkatesan et al., , 2017b . Results indicate an average MTBF of 6.1 years and an annual availability of 99.7% for the FRACASrecorded MTTR period of 7 days (Venkatesan et al., 2015d) .
In order to validate the achieved mooring performance and identify further avenues for improvement, reliability analysis is performed for the operating mooring configuration based on the component failure models published by NSWC and OREDA. The failure rates for the mooring components were computed based on the stresses acting on the mooring components under normal and extreme cyclone conditions, which were obtained from an MSB instrumented with a load cell and self-recording system for a 1-year period (Kaliyaperumal et al., 2015) . The FTA results shown in Figure 8 indicate a PoF of 14.7% (Gate Or7) under extreme weather conditions, and this corresponds to an MTBF of 6.3 years. The FTA also indicates an MTBF of 11.1 years under normal environmental conditions (Venkatesan et al., 2015c) , which indicates further scope for improvements. In the fault trees, shaded event boxes with triangles indicate the presence of downstream events, which is compressed for ease of representation (Figure 8 ).
It is found that the MTBF of the moorings increased from 1 year in 2010 to 12 years in 2013. The significant increase in the MTBF is due to the implementation of various technomanagement strategies such as the Mooring Integrity Management and Corrective Action System (MIMCAS), incorporation of the quality assurance system in the procurement of mooring components, reliability-centered mooring configuration, improvised corrosion and biofouling prevention methods, adopting best practices followed in similar MSB systems such as in NOAA-PMEL and NDBC,
FIGURE 7
MSB with green power system deployed in Indian waters.
TABLE 5
Reliability and economics of MSB power system (Venkatesan et al., 2015b (Figure 9 ). The MIMCAS has helped in improving the reliability of the mooring based on excursions observed from the deployed location under various environmental conditions that helped to analyze the load and design the scope of the mooring. MIMCAS also helps in continuously tracking a drifting buoy and enabling dispatch of a recovery team from the nearby seaport, provide online tracking to the search vessel, and enabling early reinstatement of the MSB. Thus, it helps in reducing the MTTR during failures, thereby increasing the mooring availability. With the implemented quality procedures, deployment guidelines, maintenance interval, monitoring mechanisms, and standardization, a DNV target with an annual PoF of less than 1 × 10 -5 is foreseen in the future.
MSB Electronics and INSAT Telemetry
The MSB network utilizes Inmarsat telemetry for real-time data communication with the NIOT-MCC. The Inmarsat telemetry, which is reliable and secure, features two-way communication, data acknowledgment, data storage, and forward facility (Inmarsat, 2013) . The GoI-operated INSAT 3A and 3C provide free-of-cost telemetry for the Indian Ocean observations program. As they do not provide data acknowledgment facility or the capability of working with time division multiple access technology, it is essential to evaluate the reliability before using in-time critical offshore telemetry applications (Zacharia et al., 2014) . In order to evaluate the reliability of the INSAT telemetry and the associated MSB onboard communication systems, INSAT-based telemetry systems are developed and installed in five meteorological MSBs (Figure 10) for evaluating the quality of data transmission and reception, and operated during the period from February 2014 
FIGURE 8
PoF of the mooring in a 1-year period.
FIGURE 9
MIMCAS monitoring the mooring position (Venkatesan et al., 2015a) .
to January 2015. During the 1-year evaluation period, the MSBs were set to transmit the data sets every 3 h with three consecutive transmissions every data set. Based on the collected 11,952 data sets during the 4.2 buoyyears, the data reception performance was found to be 98.046%, which indicated one failure every 51 transmissions. The performance complies with on-demand reliability level SIL3 . Postdemonstration analysis done after retrieving all the MSBs that were programmed to store the transmitted parameters in their internal database along with the time stamp during the period indicated that the MSB onboard communication system has transmitted all the data. Hence, the telemetry hardware was found to comply with the ondemand reliability of SIL4. Thus, the SIL3-rated INSAT telemetry link could not be used as for tsunami monitoring applications but is used for transmitting non-time-critical parameters and for collecting extensive meteorological and oceanographic parameters.
Sensors
Since 1997, the MSBs deployed by the NIOT-OOS group were used for monitoring 16 meteorological parameters including air pressure, air temperature, wind speed, wind direction, sea surface temperature, and sea water conductivity. Considering the need to understand the variability in the upper ocean thermohaline and current structures on varied timescales, which has important bearing on the evolution of seasonal monsoons and cyclones, the OMNI buoys were designed and deployed by NIOT-OOS since 2011. These buoy system shown in Figure 11 can measure up to 106 parameters, including meteorological, sea surface, and subsurface oceanographic parameters with the sensors fitted up to 500-m water depths. The subsurface sensors communicate the parameters through the induction mooring, which helps to reduce the number of underwater connectors. These instruments were selected based on the proven reliability and sensor stability reported by similar MSB systems such as RAMA, TAO, TRITON, ATLAS, and PIRATA data buoys (Venkatesan et al., 2013b) (Figure 11 ).
The sensor reliability data published by the instrument manufacturers are either based on the theoretical estimations or based on the failures reported from the sensors operating in varied environmental conditions, operating duration, and
FIGURE 11
Configuration of OMNI buoy system (Venkatesan et al., 2013) .
FIGURE 10
MSBs deployed for INSAT telemetry studies .
May/June 2018 Volume 52 Number 3 maintenance. The reliability data specifically applicable to instruments continuously operating in remote and harsh marine environments are not published. Based on the failure return of experiences from the sensors with an accumulated operational time of more than 8 million offshore instrumenthours over 20 years, the achieved MTBF for the 14 important instruments are summarized in Table 7 . The failure is defined when a sensor does not give an output or incorrect measurement. The incorrect measurements are flagged by the Quality Control department, which is identified by validating the sensor data at predefined time intervals. The correctness of the data is confirmed by verifying the degradation trend in the sensor output or by cross checking the sensor data with the sensor performance in the nearest data buoy. Based on the reliability analysis, it is identified that the MSB cyclone tracking sensor suite has an MTBF of around 0.5 years and an average meteorological data return of 97.9%. The identified causes for the failures are shown in Figure 12 , and the failure contributions from various MSB subsystems are shown in Figure 13 (Venkatesan et al., 2016c) . The published reliability metrics are used for by the scientific community for multiple purposes, including determining the reliability of offshore vessel dynamic positioning systems (Venkatesan et al., 2016c , Vedachalam & Ramadass, 2017 (Tables 7 and 8 ).
Terrestrial Networks and Data Reception System
The data reception architecture in NIOT-MCC is shown in Figure 14 . The MSB data through the Inmarsat are received at NIOT-MCC via Land Earth Station (LES) by two paths, one from the LES to the Inmarsat receiver modem located at NIOT and other from the LES to the NIOT mail server. The received data are then retransmitted to INCOIS through the VSAT telemetry and by the public network through secured e-mail (Figure 14) .
The NIOT-MCC data reception hardware architecture is implemented with highly reliable blade server with triple modular redundancy, hot swap feature, and expandable memory capacity. The blade server module ensures the highest availability to meet time-critical needs and is supported by a web-based management interface using enhanced data security. The software protocols in the triple redundant TABLE 7
Identified MTBF for the instruments (Venkatesan et al., 2016c 
FIGURE 12
Identified causes for the sensor failures (Venkatesan et al., 2016c) .
FIGURE 13
Failure contributions from various MSB subsystems (Venkatesan et al., 2016c) .
servers are coded to fetch the data from the Inmarsat terminal and save it in internal memory, which is also mapped on to an external memory location featuring the Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks architecture. Two redundant work stations are interfaced with the servers using redundant Ethernet links enabling efficient online reconfiguration capability and seamless maintenance. The availability of the operating power supply to the NIOT-MCC is improved by using two redundant online uninterrupted power supplies, in addition to the public mains backed by generators operated with a centralized power management system. Based on the architecture, the failure rate of the NIOT-MCC data reception system is identified as 110 FIT (Venkatesan et al., 2015a) . From the identified failure rates of the network, the PoF of the data transfer from NIOT-MCC to INCOIS is 4.54%. With the computed MTBF and the MTTR of <12 h recorded in the FRACAS register, the annual unavailability of the NIOT-MCC is about 0.5 h. It is identified that a healthiness monitoring interval of 22 h and 10 h are required to be implemented for the NIOT-MCC internal reception system and INCOIS data dispatch functions, respectively, to achieve SIL4 level of on-demand reliability. In order to ensure better on demand reliability than the identified requirements, the data are transmitted from NIOT-MCC to INCOIS every 1 h with an acknowledgment from the INCOIS server. A watchdog algorithm is also implemented in the supervisory workstations in the NIOT-MCC and programmed to automatically poll the redundant server's healthiness every 5 min and generate alarms to enable rapid troubleshooting (Venkatesan et al., 2015a) .
System Reliability Metrics
Tsunami Monitoring Network
The identified failure rates of the subsystems are used for determining the on-demand reliability, healthiness monitoring intervals, minimum number of MSB required, and the maintenance interval for the ITBS network. During a tsunami event, the deep ocean sea level data inputs from ITBS are very important for the ITEWS prerun scenario database, which computes the tsunami travel times and wave runup wave heights, which are essential for the timely generation and dissemination of the tsunami advis or ies (Kumar et al., 2016) .
The concept involved in the tsunami detection and reporting system developed by NIOT shown in Figure 15 is similar to the robust and proven Deep Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis developed by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Pacific Meteorological Environmental Laboratory (PMEL), which is operational in the Pacific, Atlantic, and Caribbean waters (Ramadass et al., 2014) . The tsunami buoys are moored at strategic locations close to the Andaman-Sumatra subduction fault in the BoB and Makran fault in the Arabian Sea (Groen et al., 2010) (Figure 16 ).
TABLE 8
Failure modes and classification for instruments (Venkatesan et al., 2016c Over the period 2008-2013, with the improvements in the reliability of the onboard batteries, electronics firmware, network redundancy, and by the implementation of the MIMCAS, the PoF of a single tsunami buoy operating in the BoB reduced from 95.95% to 68.3%, with the corresponding increase in the MTBF from 0.32 to 0.87 years. For the buoys in the Arabian Sea, the MTBF increased to 1.4 years during the same period (Venkatesan et al., 2015d) . The findings are summarized in Table 9 (Figure 17) .
From the FTA results shown in Figure 17 , with the present subsystem failure rates, it is identified that a minimum of two tsunami buoys are required in the BoB and one in the Arabian Sea and further increase in the number of buoys does not increase the availability of the network. Furthermore, the MTBF achieved with two buoys configuration in the BoB is 1.27 years, which is more than the MSB planned maintained interval of 1 year. The on-demand reliability analysis results shown in Figure 18 indicate that two buoys operating in the BoB and one in the Arabian Sea reporting their integrity to the NIOT-MCC every 10 h ensures that the ITBS complies with SIL4. However, in order to ensure the highest level of integrity, a health monitoring interval of 1 h is implemented in the MSB.
The INSAT telemetry is used for implementing the cost-effective integrity management system for the ITBS, which requires a minimum healthiness monitoring interval of 10 h. A hybrid telemetry system with the reporting architecture shown in Figure 19 was implemented in a tsunami buoy deployed in the BoB. During normal mode, the water level and the Inmarsat health status are transmitted through the SIL3-rated INSAT telemetry every hour, and during tsunami event mode, the water level data are transmitted through the SIL4-rated Inmarsat telemetry. As the INSAT telemetry is likely to experience only one failure every 51 transmissions, even if a transmission is unsuccessful, the next hour transmission will be successful, thus
FIGURE 15
Concept of sea level change monitoring (Kumar et al., 2016) .
FIGURE 14
Data reception system architecture at NIOT-MCC (Venkatesan et al., 2015a) .
ensuring the minimum healthiness monitoring interval of 10 h. During the evaluation period, the tsunami buoy with the hybrid telemetry architecture was successful in detecting a water level change during a seismic event that had its epicenter at location 07°38.63′N and 94°17.4′E. By the hybrid telemetry, significant reduction (>96%) is obtained in air time charges compared to the configuration using Inmarsat telemetry alone (Sundar et al., 2015) .
Meteorological Buoy
The meteorological and the sea surface instruments in the buoys are used for measuring the intensity of the cyclone and the associated oceanic response. Hence, the success of the cyclone warning primarily depends on the combined reliability of the meteorological sensors, sea surface sensors, mooring, data acquisition systems, on-board energy storage, and telemetry. The FTA showing the PoF of receiving the critical cyclone tracking parameters at the NIOT-MCC, which is 86.95% with a corresponding MTBF of 0.5 years, is shown in Figure 20 . The meteorological and the sea surface instruments contribute to 48.8% and 33.4% of the total failure.
With the objective of having a higher MTBF for the cyclone monitoring sensor suite, FTA is done to identify the PoF of an MSB with redundant meteorological sensor configuration, and it is found that the MTBF could be increased to 0.76 years. In order to evaluate the practical feasibility, an MSB incorporating two sensor masts with redundant meteorological instruments is realized and deployed off-Lakshadweep (Figure 21 ) islands and operated for a 1-year period. The configuration was also used for the qualification of sensors/instruments of different manufacturers operating in similar environmental conditions. The performances of the subsystems are being analyzed for future implementation in other MSBs from the technoeconomic perspective.
Discussion and Conclusion
The paper summarized the technological maturity and the reliability metrics achieved by the MSB network subsystems including onboard energy storage, mooring, telemetry, sensors including meteorological, sea surface and subsurface, INSAT telemetry, terrestrial networks, and the data reception system in NIOT-MCC based on
FIGURE 16
Strategic placement of buoys considering travel time (Kumar et al., 2016) .
TABLE 9
MTBF and availability for the ITBS (Venkatesan et al., 2015a the returns from field experiences over the past two decades. The onboard hybrid power system with redundant lithium batteries helps to achieve near-zone power system failure rates leading to the best tradeoff between reliability and battery costs. With the implemented mooring watch circle monitoring feature, stringent quality assurance efforts, and the healthy deployment methodologies adopted, the mooring MTBF has attained 12 years in 2014 from a 5-year average of 6.1 years. The on-demand reliability of the onboard electronics is found to meet the SIL4 requirements, and the INSAT telemetry, which is identified to comply with SIL3, is used for collecting extensive meteorological and oceanographic parameters and for realizing a cost-effective hybrid telemetry system. The failures observed from the moored buoy instruments, which have cumulatively clocked more than 7.3 million demanding offshore instrument-hours over the past two decades, serve as valuable inputs for the instrument manufacturers, users, and application engineers. The implemented healthiness monitoring feature ensures that the systems are maintained in the IEC 61508 SIL4, the highest level of on-demand reliability applicable to time critical systems.
Based on the present maturity of the MSB network subsystems, it is identified that the tsunami monitoring buoy network with two tsunami buoys in the BoB and one in the Arabian Sea has an MTBF of 1.27 years with an annual availability of 98.5%. An increased number of buoys shall lead to higher MTBF but does not provide the significant benefit of increasing network availability. In the case of meteorological data buoys with specific reference to cyclone tracking function,
FIGURE 17
Trees indicating PoF with ITBS operating with four buoy systems.
FIGURE 18
Healthiness monitoring interval required for SIL4 compliance (Venkatesan et al., 2015d) .
the MTBF is identified to be 0.5 years, and sensor redundancy could help to increase the MTBF to 0.76 years. Based on the identified MTBF of 0.5 years for the receipt of the MSB cyclone tracking parameters and taking into consideration the weather window available for servicing the MSB in the BoB and Arabian Sea, the annual MSB maintenance program has been formulated since 2010. The maintenance program managed by the Joint Ship Time Allocation Committee formed by the GoI ensures deep ocean MSB maintenance vessel availability for four slots/year, with 15 days/ slot. During the maintenance activity, the MSB are off-anchored, shifted to the maintenance vessel, and detailed maintenance and performance checks are carried out before redeployment.
The increasing spatiotemporal oceanographic measurement demands from the scientific community for effective weather prediction and climate modeling requires an increased number of instruments to be installed in MSB, which poses increasing challenges in operation and maintenance. The ADDRESS software features the facility to monitor the sensor performance continuously and also has provisions to validate the performance by comparing the outputs of similar sensors in closely located MSB during the same time period so that maintenance could be carried out within the next available opportunity. Continuous efforts are undertaken to reduce the environment-induced failures mainly due to biofouling, marine corrosion, and the influence of birds and sea water sloshing on to the sensors during extreme sea states. In order to reduce vandalism, programs and workshops are periodically conducted in Indian ports emphasizing its importance, and improved working mechanisms with the neighboring countries in the BoB are in place. Furthermore, as vandalism is more prevalent in coastal areas, engineering efforts such as welded fasteners for antivandalism and visual observation support using video telemetry are being implemented. A remote video observation system for real-time visual observation using high-resolution night vision cameras with an IR range of up to 30 m distance and 3G telemetry is
FIGURE 19
Reporting architecture in hybrid telemetry system (Sundar et al., 2015) .
FIGURE 20
FTA showing PoF of the cyclone monitoring parameters.
May/June 2018 Volume 52 Number 3 implemented and operational in a coastal buoy. Such efforts are expected to reduce vandalism, increase data returns, and optimize the operation costs in the future.
The reliability assessment methodology presented could be adopted for similar systems with appropriate failure data, as well as evolving standards for the oceanographic systems. The study instills confidence in the MSB observation network's reliable and cost-effective support to India's ocean observations program.
